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SIMPLE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND 
PROVIDENTIAL CONTROL: 
A RESPONSE TO HUNT 
David Basinger 
It has become quite popular recently to maintain that a God who possessed 
simple foreknowledge-knowledge of what has happened, is happening and 
will actually happen-would have absolutely no greater providential control 
over earthly affairs than a God who possessed no foreknowledge at all. 
In an article in this journal, David P. Hunt disputes this claim, arguing that 
it is at least true that it is possible for complete foreknowledge to contribute 
to more providential control than would be available with no foreknowledge. 
I argue that while Hunt's strategy-which is to place divine decision-making 
before creation and make it hypothetical-is ingenious, it ultimately fails. 
It has become popular recently to maintain that a God with Simple Fore-
knowledge-a God who knows all that has happened, is happening and will 
happen in the actual world-has absolutely no greater providential control 
over earthly affairs than a God with only Present Knowledge-a God who 
knows only what has happened and is happening in the actual world. 1 
David P. Hunt disputes this claim, arguing that, at the very least, the fol-
lowing is true: 
ST: It is possible for complete foreknowledge to contribute to more provi-
dential control than would be available with no foreknowledge (p. 405). 
Hunt realizes that to substantiate this contention, he must overcome two 
obstacles. First, there is a metaphysical problem. If God possesses Simple 
Foreknowledge (SFK), then he always knows what will happen as the result 
of his decisions before these decisions are made. But if we assume that God 
makes his decisions on the basis of all the relevant data available to him, then 
God is in the position of making his decisions at least in part on the basis of his 
knowledge of what the results of his decisions will be. And decision-making of 
this type, Hunt acknowledges, may well be a metaphysical impossibility. 
Second, there is a doxastic problem. If God has complete SFK, then he also 
knows, of course, what his decisions will be before they are made. But to 
make a decision, Hunt acknowledges, is to consider at least two possible 
options and choose between them. And even God, Hunt grants, is not free to 
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choose between options if he already knows which option he is going to 
choose. 
Hunt's solution to these problems is to separate God's decision-making 
from his knowledge of the actual world. Let us assume, he begins, that 
independently of his knowledge of the actual world, God formulates condi-
tional "judgments about what it would be best for Him to do in response to 
every possible set of conditions He might encounter." That is, let us assume 
that for every possible set of conditions, God forms judgments of the follow-
ing type: If X obtains, then it would be best to do Y. 
If God has only Present Knowledge (PK), Hunt points out, then all of these 
conditional decisions will have antecedent conditions that are temporally 
prior to the actions referred to in the consequents. But if God has SFK, then 
some of these decisions "will be such that the conditions set forth in their 
antecedents are temporally later than the actions referred to in their conse-
quents." Moreover, Hunt continues, to be able to respond to certain conditions 
before they actually obtain obviously "allows God to undertake providential 
interventions that would not otherwise have been feasible." Furthermore, 
since such interventions are in this case simply the implementation of con-
ditional decisions made independently "of any knowledge God might have 
of the actual world," both the standard doxastic and metaphysical challenges 
are avoided. And accordingly, he concludes, if we assume that God's provi-
dential activity is based on conditional decisions of this type, then we can 
justifiably maintain that ST is true-that a God with SFK might in some cases 
have a providential edge over a God with only PK (pp. 412). 
Hunt doesn't explain exactly how God can form these conditional decisions 
independently of "any knowledge [He] might have of the actual world," or 
exactly how such decisions will increase providential control. But it seems to 
me that something like the following is the strongest reading of his position. 
Let us assume that before creation-and thus before God knew (logically 
speaking) what would occur in the actual world-God formulated for every 
possible set of conditions X a conditional decision of the following type: if 
X obtains, I will do Y because I desire to bring about Z. 
Many of these conditionals will describe what God will do at time t2 if X 
occurs at time t1. But since God possesses foreknowledge in any world he 
initiates, some of these conditionals will describe what God will do at tl if 
he foresees that X will occur at t2. That is, some will be of the following 
form: If I know (possibly among other things) at time tl that X will occur at 
time t2, then I will do Y at time tl because I desire to bring about Z. 
But even for conditional decisions of this type, what must be emphasized 
is that at the logical point in time at which God formulated such decisions, 
no knowledge of the actual world was yet involved. Only after his creative 
decision-only after he decided which actualizable world to initiate-did he 
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see all that would actually occur in our world, including those antecedent 
conditions that would be actualized and, thus, exactly what he would be doing 
in response. 
However, if this is the basis for God's activity in our world, then the 
doxastic and metaphysical problems no longer arise. Although it is still the 
case that God knows before he does anything in our world exactly what he 
will be doing and what will occur as the result, the decisions that are deter-
mining his actions were made before he had access to this information. 
Yet it can still be argued that foreknowledge gives God a providential edge 
since those conditional decisions that include knowledge of future events in 
the antecedent conditions can still justifiably be said to trigger the implemen-
tation of efficacious divine activity that would otherwise not have occurred. 
I am willing to grant that by placing the actual decision-making process 
prior to creation, the standard doxastic and metaphysical problems can be 
circumvented. But it seems to me that other related problems still plague 
Hunt's 'conditional decision' model and thus render it unable to establish that 
SFK can increase God's control over earthly affairs. 
The best way to initiate a discussion of these problems, I believe, is to 
consider a test case. Let us imagine that a young man named Tom asks a 
young woman named Sue to marry him and that Sue comes to God in prayer 
for advice. Moreover, let's assume that among the beliefs that God holds as 
he considers this request is the belief that Sue will respond very negatively 
if her spouse dies a tragic death soon after marriage and, thus, that she ought 
not be encouraged to marry if it is known or believed justifiably that such a 
death will occur. And, finally, let us assume that while, if God possessed only 
PK, he would have no reason to think Tom will die in the near future and 
thus would encourage Sue to accept the proposal on the basis of the infor-
mation available, God is in fact going to attempt to convince Sue to reject 
the proposal because he possesses SFK and foresees that Tom is going to die 
in a horrible automobile accident a year from now. 
It might appear that we here have a clear case in which foreknowledge 
contributes "to more providential control than would be available with no 
foreknowledge." Even if God did not possess SFK, he would believe that the 
imminent death of Tom would make the marriage unwise. But it is only 
because he possesses SFK, it seems, that he is in a position to see that Tom 
will die in the auto accident and thus in a position to offer Sue the best advice. 
If we assume that God's response to Sue-his attempt to convince her not 
to accept Tom's proposal-is the implementation of a conditional decision 
made before creation, the crucial question for our purpose is clear: What 
exactly is the conditional decision that is triggering the divine activity in this 
case? Since what is allegedly initiating God's response to Sue is his belief 
that Sue ought not marry someone who will die soon after marriage and his 
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foreknowledge of the fact that Tom is going to die in a year, it might appear 
that the relevant conditional in this case is the following: 
Dl: I have decided (without knowing what will actually occur) that if Sue 
asks me whether she should marry Tom and I not only believe that it 
will be best for Sue not to marry someone who will die tragically soon 
after their marriage but also know that Tom will die in an automobile 
accident a year from now, then I will attempt to convince Sue to reject 
Tom's proposal because I want what is best for Sue. 
But in any world W in which Sue asks God whether she should marry Tom 
and God foreknows that Tom will die tragically in a year, a God with complete 
foreknowledge also foreknows not only how he will respond to Sue's request 
in W but whether what is best for Sue will or will not come about. Thus, if 
we assume that when God made his conditional decisions before creation, he 
included in the antecedent conditions all the relevant information to which 
he would have access at the time they were implemented, then it appears that 
we must replace D 1 with some instantiation of the following conditional 
pattern: 
D2: I have decided (without knowing what will actually occur) that if Sue 
asks me whether she should marry Tom and I know that Tom will die in 
an automobile accident a year from now and that I will attempt to 
convince Sue to reject Tom's proposal and that what is best for her will 
(or will not) come about, then I will attempt to convince Sue to reject 
Tom's proposal because I want what is best for Sue. 
But D2 is problematic on two counts. First, as has already been stated, to 
say that God has decided to do X under certain conditions is to say that God 
could also have decided not to do X under exactly the same conditions. 
Applied to D2, this means that if God actually decided before creation that 
he would attempt to influence Sue to reject Tom's proposal if he were to 
encounter the antecedent conditions stipulated in D2, then he could also have 
decided before creation that he would not attempt to discourage the marriage 
under these very same conditions. 
However, God could not have made this decision under the conditions in 
question because these conditions include God's knowledge of the fact that 
he will attempt to influence Sue to reject Tom's proposal, and even God is 
not free to do what he knows he will not do. But if God could not have decided 
not to discourage the marriage under the conditions in question, then it cannot 
be the case, as D2 stipulates, that God decided to discourage the marriage if 
he encountered these conditions. Given the conditions stated in D2, there is 
simply no decision to be made. 
Moreover, an analogous problem would obviously surface with respect to 
any variant of D2 whose antecedent included foreknowledge of what God 
will in fact decide to do. 
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Second, to include God's knowledge of what will or will not happen to Sue 
in the antecedent conditions of D2 also generates difficulties. If we assume 
that the antecedent conditions that are to trigger God's activity include his 
knowledge of the fact that his desired end-what is best for Sue-will not 
come about, then it obviously cannot be said that these antecedent condi-
tions-even if they also include God's foreknowledge of the fact that Tom is 
going to die-can trigger divine activity that will increase God's ability to 
bring about that which he desires to come about in this case. And if we assume 
that these antecedent conditions include God's knowledge of the fact that 
what is best for Sue will come about, then again it cannot be said that these 
antecedent conditions can trigger divine activity that will increase God's 
ability to bring about what he desires, for in this case we are already assured 
that what is best for Sue will actually occur regardless of the type of activity 
D2 directs God to implement. 
Moreover, analogous problems would plague any variant of D2 that incor-
porated in the antecedent conditions foreknowledge of the fact that God's 
desired ends will (or will not) occur. 
But what if we assume, as does Hunt, that when formulating his conditional 
decisions, God was not required to take into consideration all the relevant 
data that would be available to him when these decisions were implemented 
(pp. 404-408)? Specifically, what if we remove totally from the antecedent 
conditions God's knowledge of how he is going to respond to Sue and replace 
his knowledge of what is going to happen to Sue with a justified belief about 
what will quite probably come about if she refuses Tom's proposal? We are 
then left with the following modification of D 1: 
D3: I have decided (without knowing what will actually occur) that if Sue 
asks me whether she should marry Tom and I know that Tom will die in 
an automobile accident a year from now and I justifiably believe that, 
if Sue refuses Tom's proposal, it is quite probable that what is best for 
Sue will come about, then I will encourage Sue to reject Tom's proposal 
because I want what is best for Sue. 
But D3 also offers no support for ST. Even if we continue to grant that 
God's response to Sue's request could justifiably be triggered by antecedent 
conditions that do not include all that God would know about Tom and Sue 
at the time of this response, it still remains true that in any world W in which 
Sue asks God at time tl whether she should marry Tom, a God with SFK will 
know (among other things) at tl in W (1) whether Sue will refuse or accept 
Tom's proposal and (2) whether what is best for Sue will or will not come 
about as a result. 
Let us assume first that what God knows in W is that Sue will refuse Tom's 
proposal and that what is best for her will come about as a result. In this case, 
God cannot believe in W that it is quite probable that what is best for Sue 
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will come about if she refuses Tom's proposal. For to believe that something 
will quite probably come about-as opposed to knowing with certainty that 
it will come about-is to acknowledge that it is possible that it might not 
come about. But if God knows in W that Sue will in fact refuse Tom's proposal 
and that it will in fact be best that she did, then God cannot simultaneously 
believe in W that it is even possible that what is best for Sue might not in 
fact come about if the proposal is refused. 
Moreover, an even more serious problem of this type arises if we assume 
that what God knows in W is that Sue will refuse Tom's proposal but that 
what is best for Sue will not in fact come about as a result. Not even God 
can believe that something is the case if he knows that it is not the case. Thus, 
if God does in fact know in W that what is best for Sue will not in fact come 
about if she refuses Tom's proposal, then he again cannot at the same time 
believe that it is quite probable that what is best for Sue will in fact come 
about if she refuses the proposal. And, of course, if God cannot hold this 
belief about Sue in W, then the antecedent conditions noted in D3 can never 
be fully satisfied in W, and D3, accordingly, can never trigger providentially 
efficacious divine behavior in W. 
But what if God knows in W that Sue will not refuse Tom's proposal and 
that what is best for Sue will occur as a result? Or what if God knows in W 
that Sue will not refuse Tom's proposal and that what is best will not occur 
as a result? In either case, God could in W still justifiably continue to believe 
counterfactually that, if Sue were to refuse Tom's proposal, it is quite prob-
able that what is best for Sue would come about. But a belief about what 
would happen if Sue were to reject Tom's proposal gives God absolutely no 
information about how Sue will (or even will probably) respond to Tom's 
death in a world in which she does accept Tom's proposal, and thus the 
implementation of D3 in W under these conditions could in no sense increase 
the likelihood that what God desires to bring about-namely, that Sue respond 
to Tom's death in the best manner possible-will in fact come about in W. 
Nor, of course, will it help to exclude even beliefs about how Sue will 
respond to Tom's death from the antecedent conditions, for if there is nothing 
in the antecedent conditions of God's decision that indicates how Sue will 
respond to Tom's death if she accepts or rejects his proposal, then again the 
implementation of such a decision can in no sense increase God's ability to 
bring about his desired end. 
Other scenarios could be considered, but we are now in a position to see 
why Hunt's 'conditional decision' model is flawed in principle. I see no 
reason to deny that a God with SFK could have decided before creation how 
he would respond if certain conditions were to obtain. But when we attempt 
to identify what must be included in the antecedent conditions of such con-
ditionals if their implementation is to increase God's providential control-to 
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establish ST -we find ourselves in an inescapable dilemma. We cannot allow 
God's knowledge of what he is going to decide to do to be included, for then 
no decision is actually possible. Nor can we allow the fact that the desired 
ends will come about to be included, for then we are already assured that 
what God wants to occur will occur regardless of what God does in response. 
And we cannot allow beliefs about whether God's desired ends will probably 
come about under certain circumstances to be included for, given that God 
possesses complete SFK, such beliefs will either be impossible for God to 
hold or counterfactual in a manner that renders them void of providential 
efficacy. 
But if we do not allow the antecedent conditions of such conditionals to 
include any indication of the circumstances under which God's desired ends 
are likely to occur, then the implementation of the consequents of these 
conditionals can in no sense increase the likelihood that God will achieve his 
desired ends-can in no sense increase God's providential control. 
So I still stand by what I and others have argued: a God with simple 
foreknowledge has no greater providential control over the world than does 
a God with only PK. At least I do not see that Hunt has given us a good 
reason to believe otherwise. 
Roberts Wesleyan College 
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